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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) represent a network of resource-constrained sensor devices con-
nected through the open Internet which are susceptible to misuse by intruders. Proliferation
of IoT across diverse application domains renders their security critical to ensure normal
service delivery by such infrastructures. Traditional standalone intrusion detection systems
are tasked with monitoring device behaviours to identify malicious activities. These systems
not only require extensive network and system resources but also cause delays in detecting
a malicious actor due to unavailability of a comprehensive view of the intruder’s activities.
Collaboration among IoT devices enables considering knowledge from a collection of host and
network devices to achieve improved detection accuracy in a timely manner. However, collab-
oration introduces the challenge of energy efficiency and event processing which is particularly
significant for resource-constrained devices. In this paper, we present an intrusion detection
framework for IoT (COLIDE) that leverages collaboration among resource-constrained sensor
devices and border nodes for effective and timely detection of intruders. The paper presents a
detailed description of the proposed framework along with its formal description and analysis
to assess its effectiveness for a typical IoT system. We implemented the COLIDE frame-
work with Contiki OS and conducted thorough experimentation to evaluate its performance.
This evaluation demonstrates efficiency of COLIDE framework with respect to energy and
processing overheads achieving effectiveness within an IoT system.
1 Introduction
The use of sensor devices has increased dramatically over the last few years leading to their pro-
liferation across diverse domains such as wearables, intelligent appliances, and vehicles. As these
devices have the ability to be connected to the Internet, it introduces exciting possibilities such
as the Internet of Things (IoT). IoT has received significant attention as a disruptive technology
and is considered fundamental to the networks of the future. A recent study by the Gartner has
predicted the number of sensor devices to increase to more than 20 billion devices by the year 2020
[1]. This has a direct impact on industrial applications such as automotive industry, commercial
security cameras, as well as consumer applications such as wearables, smart TVs, and smart meters.
A typical IoT network consists of devices with resource constraints such as limited processing
power, energy resources, and communication range etc. These constraints mandate an IoT net-
work to have an efficient communication protocol that requires limited energy overheads, provides
efficient performance under diverse conditions, and supports larger address space. To this extent,
6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks) [2],[3],[4], allows resource-
constrained sensor devices to send and receive communication events as IPv6 packets over IEEE
802.15.4 based networks. Additionally, 6LoWPAN facilitates communication among low power
wireless personal area networks using IPv6 by performing header compression and fragmentation
[5]. This enables the things to still use IP based Internet, leveraging standards and technologies
developed over the last few decades. For a typical LoWPAN, this connectivity is achieved by using
an edge router which facilitates connectivity among the devices participating within a LoWPAN
as well as with the Internet.
However, the open network architecture of IoT has also attracted intruders to use the network
of thousands of devices for spreading malicious content. Due to the proliferation of such devices
in almost every aspect of our life, the threats posed due to their insufficient security are unique
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with insecure devices exposing the end users to serious security and privacy threats. For instance,
if an attacker is able to compromise an in-car WiFi, all in-car devices and data will be at risk.
Once inside the network, an attacker can spoof the car, connect to outside data sources, and
steal the owner’s personal information including credit card data [6]. With regards to 6LoWPAN
implementation, most of the IoT security threats originate from the 802.15.4, IP network and its
adaptation layer. Therefore, the challenge for an effective and secure intrusion detection system for
a 6LoWPAN based IoT network is two-fold: firstly, these devices are typically resource-constrained
which limits their ability to host sophisticated security system that can monitor the device in real
time. Secondly, the ad-hoc nature of 6LoWPAN networks allows devices to connect to other devices
at runtime, typically for short time periods, thereby creating a dynamic network.
A number of efforts have been made to address security for IoT in general and with respect
to intrusion detection in particular [7, 8, 9]. However, these are generally focused at standalone
intrusion detection components which are integrated with the sensor device or the high-powered
device such as cluster head. These approaches are limited in that they consider a restricted view
of the events within an IoT network and therefore are limited in their ability to address complex,
multi-stage, coordinated, and distributed attacks. We believe that collaboration in intrusion de-
tection enables end devices to use the collective information from the number of devices to have
more accurate and wider overview of the characteristics of IP traffic passing through them.
In this paper, we build on our existing work [10] and present a COLlaborative Intrusion
DEtection (COLIDE) framework for IoT networks. In particular, the framework envisages collec-
tive use of information from the host and network-based detection systems. The detection system
is divided into two layers: an edge router layer, and an end-host/node layer. The end-host com-
ponent monitors the events at the node level and reports anomalous events to the network/edge
router level system to correlate the alerts to perform aggregate detection. We believe correlating
alerts from multiple devices will not only minimize false positive rate and improve the detection
rate under distributed attacks, but will also reduce the workload at the end host. Therefore, the
proposed framework is envisioned to address challenges such as the flexibility, resource constraints
of the nodes, and collaborative nature of the IoT networks.
The overall contributions made by this paper are presented below.
• A novel intrusion detection framework for IoT networks focused on achieving efficient in-
trusion detection through collaboration between host and network-based intrusion detection.
• Efficient detection of complex, multi-stage attacks achieved via collaboration between
sensor nodes and the edge router.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the background on intrusion
detection systems and 6LowPAN along with an attack model for the IoT networks highlighting
specific threats addressed by the COLIDE framework. Section 3 presents the related work regarding
intrusion detection within an IoT network. Section 4 presents our collaborative approach and its
formal representation and analysis using Z notation. Section 5 presents the implementation of the
setup that we propose followed by the performance evaluation of the proposed framework in section
6. Section 7 provides discussion of properties of proposed system. Finally, section 8 concludes the
paper.
2 Background and Threat Model
In this section, we present basic concepts used throughout the rest of this paper which are important
to understand the proposed system. Furthermore, we include an attack model identifying the
threats addressed by the COLIDE framework.
2.1 Ipv6 over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoW-
PANs)
A major factor in the uptake of IoT is its ability to integrate sensor devices with the Internet
allowing them to communicate with other devices and systems. These devices typically include au-
tomation and home appliances creating Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (LoWPANs).
One of the most commonly used technology for LoWPAN is IEEE802.15.4 [11]. This standard
describes the PHY and MAC layer requirement for a low rate, low-power wireless embedded radio
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Figure 1: A typical 6LoWPAN system
communication. It is capable of operating in three different frequency band namely, 2400 MHz
ISM, 915 MHz ISM and 868 MHz European band. The MAC layer protocol is responsible for
achieving efficient sharing of channel bandwidth and the quantity of energy required for efficient
communication. MAC layer module controls the way packets are transmitted and received. Gener-
ally, two approaches are used in the literature to classify different types of protocol for transmission
and reception of packets in the channel i.e. the reservation and the contention based protocols.
The reservation-based protocols attempt to optimize energy and throughput by dividing the net-
work into clusters referred to as Personal Area Networks (PANs). Each PAN will have a cluster
head that coordinates the transmissions among the nodes within the PAN. Whereas the contention
based approach uses Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) and focuses
on detecting medium activity in the channel. When using CSMA/CA mechanism, a node tries to
sense the medium before transmitting the packet. If another node is already sending through the
medium it withdraws itself to avoid a collision when there is high traffic. In order for these devices
to connect to the Internet, they each need to have a unique IP address. IPv4 has many limitations
such as the address size which limits the number of connected devices. This is easily solved by
using IPv6. IPv6 nodes are assigned 128 bit IP addresses in a hierarchical manner, through a
network prefix of arbitrary length. IEEE 802.15.4 devices may use either of IEEE 64-bit extended
addresses or, after an association event, 16-bit addresses that are unique within a PAN.
A significant problem within this context is that IPv6 requires the maximum transmission unit
(MTU) to be at least 1280 octets. In contrast, IEEE 802.15.4’s standard packet size is 127 octets.
A maximum frame overhead of 25 octets spares 102 octets at the media access control layer. An
optional but highly recommended security feature at the link layer poses an additional overhead.
For example, 21 octets are consumed for AES-CCM-128 leaving only 81 octets for upper layers.
In order to solve this, 6LowPAN adaptation layer was introduced.
6LoWPAN [12] is a technology standard defined by IETF to enable IPv6 stack to smoothly
operate over IEEE 802.15.4 MAC link layer. As an adaptation layer, it compresses all headers
including, 40 Bytes of IPv6 header from the network and 8 Bytes of UDP header from the transport
into a few bytes. For IPv6 frames to be transmitted over IEEE 802.15.4 radio links, the IPv6 frames
have to be divided into partitions and more data generated to resemble the original format. During
packet retrieval, additional data is removed to maintain the original format. 6LoWPAN supports
routing in the network and link layer.The link layer uses mesh-under while the network layer uses
route-over. In mesh-under routing, the adaptation layer sends packets through multiple radio
hops, while the route over scheme performs routing at the network layer with the nodes acting as
a router. Thus, every hop in the link represents an IP hop to send packets across the links. Figure
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1 shows the architecture of 6LoWPAN network, host devices can be either fixed (static) or mobile,
depending on the application design. The edge router handles communication between 6LoWPAN
devices, Internet, and other IP networks. It manages maintenance and generation of 6LoWPAN
subnets and also handles data exchange between devices in the network.
2.2 Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Network
As 6LoWPAN networks are expected to be densely populated. Packets will need to be routed
throughout the network to reach their destination. Several routing protocols have been proposed
by the 6LoWPAN community. However, only two routing protocols are currently legitimate for
large-scale deployments: LOADng [13], and RPL [14]. This work is performed using Routing
Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Network (RPL).
RPL is an IPv6-based Routing Protocol for LowPANs, designed by IETF Routing Over Low
Power and Lossy network (ROLL) working group. It is a distance-vector routing protocol that op-
erates on top of IEEE 802.15.4 Physical and Data Link layers. It organizes nodes in a Destination-
Oriented-Acyclic-Graph (DODAG), where each router identifies a set of parents, each of which is
a potential next hop on a path towards the root of the DODAG. The preferred parent is selected
based on a metric or constraint among other candidates. RPL supports different kinds of network
traffic, which includes; point to point, multi-point-to-point, and point to multi-point communica-
tion. RPL supports bidirectional links that enable uplink and downlink traffics. Each of the nodes
in the network comprises of the Low Power and Lossy Network border router (LBR), the routers
and the host. During network formation, RPL creates a tree-like topology with the border router
serving as the root and the routers and host forming the edges to propagating information up and
down the link of the network. Each node in RPL network has a rank, which states its position
relative to other nodes with the LBR having a rank of minimum rank value, then the rank increases
towards the leaves of the DODAG. The rank value is computed using the objective function. The
objective function contains the routing metrics and objectives used in forming the network.
IPv6 over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) [3],[4] has a profound role
in this. 6LoWPAN is a networks technology that allows IPv6 packets to be carried efficiently
within small link layer frames such as those defined by IEEE 802.15.4. This enables the much
sought after integration of sensor devise within a WPAN with the Internet thereby realising the
long-term objective of the Internet of "Things". A graphical representation of a typical 6LoWPAN
is provided in Fig. 1. Typically, the Internet connectivity for the "things" is handled by a wireless
access point whereas the 6LoWPAN network is connected to the IPv6 network using an edge router
which handles: data exchange between 6LowPAN devices and the Internet, local data exchange
between devices inside the 6LoWPAN, and generation and maintenance of radio subnet.
2.3 Threat Model for the Internet of Things
Although the IoT is an emerging paradigm, a significant part of the software stack used by the
IoT applications is adopted from the existing computing paradigms. This is also evident from the
integration of IoT specific stack (such as specific to 6LoWPAN and RPL) [15] with the existing
Internet infrastructure such as IPv4 and IPv6. Consequently, an attack model for IoT infrastruc-
tures is not restricted to the threats specific to the new routing protocols such as 6LoWPAN and
RPL but also includes threats to existing infrastructure such as IPv6, application specific attacks
and attacks specific to the physical media such as the radio spectrum. The attack model for a
typical IoT network is presented in Figure 2.
Our research is aimed at developing a collaborative intrusion detection system for IoT infras-
tructures. Therefore, we focus on two types of threats for this paper i.e. routing-specific and
software or application specific threats. As our proposed system is a software entity, we render the
threats at the physical layer out of scope of this research.
2.3.1 Routing-specific attacks
Routing attacks directly impact the low power devices and their routing tables. This can be
achieved by making the flooding or denial of service attacks with respect to routing tables. Potential
routing attacks for an IoT system are presented below.
Rank attack: 6LoWPAN networks use ranking to establish optimal routing path. Within this
context, Node Rank indicates the quality of the path from a node to the sink node. Every time a
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Figure 2: Attack Model for Internet of Things Network.
node updates its rank or preferred parent, it needs to inform other nodes by sending the updated
information in the next cycle. RPL uses the rank rule such that a node in the parent should always
have a lower rank than its children to prevent the loop creation. This enables creating an optimal
topology, preventing loop creation and manage control overhead [16]. As identified by [16, 17, 18]
the rank information can be maliciously tampered with by an attacker so that it chooses the node
with worst rank to be its parent. This will result in disrupting the topology of the network causing
delays in normal transmission.
Wormhole attack: A wormhole can be considered as a tunnel between two nodes using wired or
wireless links and can be used to achieve faster transmission rates or dedicated connection between
such nodes. As such, a wormhole has legitimate applications such as the connection between the
local and global IDS modules within our architecture. However, a wormhole as identified by [19],
can be used by an attacker to create a dedicated tunnel with a node on the Internet. Wormhole
attack is not novel to the IoT networks and has been historically identified as a potential threat
for wireless sensor networks[20, 21, 22].
Sinkhole attack: The objective of a sinkhole attack is to attract traffic through a designated
node using illegitimate information making the node a lucrative routing sink (base station within
wireless network terminology). As with wormhole attack, literature around sinkhole attack is well
established with [23] being an initial effort to identify and mitigate against such attack. Creating
a sinkhole does not necessarily disrupt legitimate transmission within a 6LoWPAN. However,
diverting the traffic through a specific route creates opportunities to launch other attacks such as
wormhole and selective forwarding attack described below.
Selective forwarding attack: With selective forwarding attack, a malicious node attempts to
disrupt legitimate transmission and routing path. The malicious node, in this case, attempts to
block certain packets and forward selected packets thereby affecting the routing. For instance, an
attacker can forward all RPL control messages but block the rest [19]. This attack can cause more
damage when used in conjunction with sinkhole attack. Such dependencies among different attack
types have motivated us to explore the impact of multi-stage attacks within IoT infrastructures.
To the best of our knowledge, the intrusion detection system presented in this paper is a pioneering
effort to identify this issue and explore a solution to mitigate against it especially for IoT systems.
Fragment duplication attack: The fragment duplication attack leverages a weakness within the
6LoWPAN layer with respect to how fragmented packets are received and assembled by an IoT
node. A consequence of the integration of 6LoWPAN with IPv6 networks is that bigger packets
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supported by IPv6 have to be fragmented into smaller packets so as to be effectively processed by
the resource-constrained nodes within an IoT system. However, as identified by [24], a recipient
node cannot verify if two fragments of a packet were sent from the same source. Therefore, the
recipient node is unable to distinguish between legitimate and spoofed fragments. A malicious
node can exploit this vulnerability to block reassembly of targeted packets such as connection
establishment packets. This may result in disrupting legitimate traffic as well as depleting resources
available to the victim node.
Buffer reservation attack: The buffer reservation attack is closely linked to the fragment du-
plication attack and may be caused as a consequence of a successful fragment duplication attack.
The buffer reservation attack also targets the vulnerability in the fragmentation mechanism em-
ployed by 6LoWPAN networks. As identified by [24], it leverages the fact that the recipient of a
fragmented packet is unable to determine if all fragments will be received correctly. Therefore, a
recipient node reserves a buffer space based on the information provided in the 6LoWPAN header
with any additional fragments discarded. Taking advantage of this setting, a malicious node can
send its victim single FRAG1 to reserve arbitrary buffer space thereby consuming scarce memory
of the resource-constrained node.
Sybil and clone ID attack: Sybil and clone ID attacks are similar in that the objective of the
attacker is to use spoofed logical identities within a network without deploying physical devices.
In particular, for clone ID attack, an attacker is aiming to use a victim’s logical identity within the
network. Whereas, in Sybil attack, the attacker aims to assume multiple logical identities within
a network without deploying physical nodes. These logical identities may not be currently present
in the network. A number of existing efforts such as [19] and [23] have identified these attacks for
IoT and historically for wireless sensor networks.
2.3.2 Application Specific Threats
In addition to routing specific threats mentioned above, IoT infrastructures are susceptible to
other types of threats such as application specific threats. Although routing forms an essential
component of the IoT system, the IoT devices are expected to run application software required
by the function envisaged to be performed. We categorize these threats as application specific and
present them below. Denial of service attack: Historically, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are
used to make the victim unavailable for legitimate service. This can be achieved via flooding the
victim with the extraordinarily large volume of requests or by exhausting the resources such as
memory and computational power available to the victim. Within IoT, the threat of DoS attack
is two-fold: the victim can be part of the network under threat that an attacker wishes to make
unavailable or the victim can be used as a zombie (stepping stone) to launch a Distributed DoS
(DDoS) on a target IoT network. The significance of these threats within IoT systems have been
identified by [25, 26, 27]
Malicious code injection: As identified by [26] and [28], malicious code injection is another
application specific threat to IoT systems. The attacker, in this case, attempts to inject malicious
code to get privileged access to the victim. Consequently, the attacker can damage the normal
operation by causing a threat to the data or to the network using one of the routing specific attacks
described in the previous section.
Traditional subversion attacks: In addition to the above-mentioned attacks, IoT systems are
vulnerable to the existing attacks targeted at computer systems such as message interception,
fabrication, modification, subversion, and phishing etc. As with the routing-specific attacks, these
attacks can also form a part of a more complicated and sophisticated attack.
3 Intrusion Detection within IoT Systems
The history of intrusion detection within IoT networks has its foundations within the Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) where the focus has mostly been on identifying and mitigating against
threats affecting routing protocols. The routing protocols within such networks were optimized to
work within a resource-constrained environment and therefore prioritize performance over security
[29]. With the introduction of LoWPAN and RPL networks, sensor networks are now connected
to the contemporary IP network resulting in expansion of the attack surface of such networks.
Therefore, such networks are not only vulnerable to malicious attempts targeting routing protocols
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but also to the contemporary internet-based attacks such as code-injection, DoS, and phishing -
we presented a bespoke attack model for IoT networks in the previous section. We believe, the
cutting edge efforts in IDS for IoT networks should take these considerations into account to
mitigate against such malicious attempts.
Within this context, we present an overview of existing efforts for intrusion detection in IoT
systems. Although our research identified linkage between Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) and
IoT systems, however, we do not include literature items related to intrusion detection in WSN.
This is because the type and volume of attacks faced by IoT systems are significantly different
from that of WSN mainly due to IP connectivity as highlighted by the threat model presented in
the previous section.
[30] presents one of the early efforts to establish an IDS for IoT where authors proposed a host-
based IDS for LoWPANs using Contiki OS [14] and 6LowPAN [3],[4]. The IDS is able to perform
detection based on the information at the node level and then transmit data to some centralized
system for further analysis. The detection system performs detection using information collected
from individual nodes and does not consider the information from other nodes in the network. The
system does not show effective detection under the distributed denial of service attack that not
only overwhelms the device but also congests the communication channel between nodes and the
centralized system.
Kasinathan et al. [31] presented an IDS framework for 6LoWPAN which was able to detect
denial of service attacks by monitoring physical parameters of the device. In [32] authors proposed
a distributed system architecture for detecting the version number attacks in RPL-based networks
and identify malicious nodes. Furthermore, a number of intrusion detection system architectures
have been developed in [33, 34] for the resource-constrained 6LoWPAN devices based systems
focusing on the sinkhole and selective-forwarding attacks (well-known attacks within 6LoWPAN
networks). Our work is different from these systems, as it provides a generic framework for intrusion
detection within IoT networks which is capable of working with diverse devices addressing a range
of issues including different types of attacks, the inherent flexibility of the IoT networks, and the
lack of trust among the participant devices.
An architecture to protect against DoS attacks within 6LoWPANs has been presented in [35]
where the system uses network-level traffic and attack signature to identify malicious traffic. More-
over, Jun and Chi addressed the problem of processing a significant volume of alerts and network
traffic as a part of intrusion detection in [36]. The authors identified the challenge of a significant
volume of network traffic within a limited time to be processed by an intrusion detection mod-
ule and proposed to use established Complex Event Processing (CEP) techniques to address this
challenge. The work presented is different from our proposed system mainly due to the focus of
research. For the proposed system, we focus on a generic IoT system which can include devices of
any types (constrained or unconstrained) whereas the authors in [37, 31] have specifically designed
the system for constrained devices. Furthermore, as a part of our proposed system, we envision to
work within an untrustworthy and flexible environment where different devices can come together
without previous handshakes to deliver a certain service in a coordinated manner.
A number of machine learning systems have also been proposed for detecting malicious nodes
in an IoT network [38, 39, 40, 41]. However, measuring behaviour patterns of device usage and
processing it via multistage neural networks could have a high-energy consumption. Additionally,
the intrusion detection based on a machine learning system would require having a database of
malicious and normal signatures at the IoT node, which is again not feasible due to the high memory
consumption. The confidentiality and integrity of the data exchanged between IoT devices and
the core system can be protected through the use of cryptography mechanism [42]. However,
the energy resources required for encrypting the data makes these approaches infeasible to be
deployed in a real system implementation. A number of trust and reputation based systems have
also been proposed for analysing the reputation of the nodes in such network. For instance, Azad
et al. [43, 44] presented a reputation aggregation system for devices in the IoT network that
is then used to identify the malicious devices without affecting the privacy of the participants.
Furthermore, Roux et al. [45] proposed an approach to characterize the behaviour of legitimate
and non-legitimate communications based on the profiling and monitoring of the Radio Signal
Strength Indication (RSSI) associated with the wireless transmissions of the connected objects. A
number of trust based systems have also been proposed that compute the reputation of devices
by considering the social connectivity network of devices and similarity measure between device
feedback [46, 47, 48]. In [49], authors proposed a game theory based technique to perform the
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anomaly detection in the IoT network by matching the attack signature. The authors further
developed the reputation model based on the game theory to minimize the false positive rate
incurred because of signature matching.
Our research has identified a number of existing solutions designed for resource-constrained
devices i.e. RPL devices that process the packets at the centralized or local level. The solutions that
are able to exploit the RPL mechanisms will be more energy efficient while providing satisfactory
detection performances with respect to version number attacks. These systems normally consider
the local network-agnostic view of the major events in the neighborhood devices. We believe that
monitoring and intrusion detection systems should be generic and can be applied to any type of
IoT devices independent of routing protocols. In view of this, the intrusion detection framework
proposed in this paper does not focus on specific devices. We believe that being agnostic of the
device types our proposed framework can achieve applicability in wider scenarios and application
domains.
Furthermore, an IDS should take into account local and global levels of monitoring i.e. perform
detection in a collaborative way. The collaborative system would allow devices to interact with
each other or with a centralized system to get useful information which can be used for intrusion
detection. Within this context, our proposed system implements collaboration between host and
network level intrusion detection components to achieve a comprehensive view of the events. We
believe this setting is paramount in enabling our proposed framework to perform efficient detection
of complex multi-stage attacks.
4 The COLIDE Framework
We believe that effective intrusion detection is fundamental to achieving overall security for IoT.
Within this context, we propose a collaborative intrusion detection system for IoT infrastructures
(COLIDE) which takes into account unique characteristics of IoT systems and emphasizes the
cooperative nature of such systems. A graphical representation of our proposed framework is
presented in Fig 3.
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Figure 3: A collaborative intrusion detection system for IoT.
As depicted in Fig 3, the COLIDE framework proposes to conduct intrusion detection at two
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levels i.e. the node, and the edge router. These are described below in more detail.
Node level detection: The node level detection module is envisioned to be a lightweight mod-
ule in accordance with the relatively constrained resources available at individual sensors nodes.
However, the resource-constrained nature of sensor nodes should not prohibit implementing node-
level intrusion detection as the visibility offered by a node level system is unique and can improve
the overall intrusion detection. In this regard, we propose using signature-based intrusion detec-
tion within nodes due to their efficiency with respect to computational resources as compared with
anomaly-based detection. Furthermore, the choice of implementation for network vs host-based
monitoring at node level is rendered application specific as it will influence the type of attacks that
can be detected. For instance, a Denial of Service (DoS) attack targeted to flood nodes within
a LoWPAN can be detected by monitoring network traffic. Whereas a backdoor channel attack
targeted at gaining unauthorized access to a node can be detected by monitoring system events.
Therefore, the detection engine for the node level module processes the information generated by
the monitor(s) using existing signatures to detect any attack attempts.
Edge router detection: An edge router is an important component of an IoT system as it
enables connectivity between the LoWPAN(s) and the Internet. With emerging infrastructures
such as Fog and Edge Computing [50], the significance of edge routers has increased with multiple
services such as firewalls, and traffic filters etc. being implemented at these devices. This has been
possible due to increased computing capabilities of these devices. Inspired by the Fog computing
paradigm, we envisage leveraging the capabilities of edge routers to achieve rigorous intrusion
detection for IoT systems. To this extent, the edge router detection module is designed to monitor
traffic for LoWPAN(s) attached to it, therefore, monitoring traffic for all the devices within a
LoWPAN. Among others, this enables detection of attacks targeting an entire LoWPAN due to
the level of visibility offered by the edge router. Within the proposed system, the edge router
detection module has three components: Alert Collector, Correlation Agent, and Detection Agent.
As an edge router is expected to monitor all the sensor devices within a LoWPAN, a method is
required to identify threats to individual sensors. Alert Collector (AC) is expected to achieve this
function by communicating with individual IoT devices to gather alerts from the node level moni-
toring components. Due to the function of this component, an alert collector will be implemented
using multi-threading as it will be communicating with multiple IoT devices simultaneously. A
typical intrusion is usually not an isolated event that can be achieved within a single transaction
or network event but it is usually a series of steps each of which may target a specific vulnera-
bility with the aim to achieve the overall successful intrusion [51, 52]. Correlation Agent (CA)
component is devised to facilitate countermeasure for such attacks by correlating malicious events
at network and system levels as monitored by the node level monitors. This enables improved
visibility into the events within IoT devices and facilitates the overall intrusion detection process.
Historically, anomaly-based intrusion detection approaches have demonstrated better efficiency es-
pecially with respect to the detection of complex, multistage, and zero-day attacks however at the
cost of increased resource consumption. Due to the increased capability of edge router devices,
we, therefore, propose implementing anomaly-based intrusion detection at the edge router. The
Detection Engine (DE) component at the edge router is expected to achieve this by making use of
the alerts collected and correlated by the alert collector and alert correlation components.
In order to facilitate efficient implementation of our proposed framework and to assess its
effectiveness, we have used the Z notation to represent our framework in formal representation. As
described above, the COLIDE framework is composed of two major modules i.e. Node level and
Edge Router module. Formal description for each of these is presented below.
4.1 Node level Module
In order to achieve a coherent representation across the different levels of security alerts, we consider
the term event to represent an instance at the system or network level.
Let us define an event within a given host H as Ehi . As the proposed system is flexible in terms
of implementation of the host-based component, this event can represent a system event such as
a system call or a networking event such as a network packet. In both scenarios, Ehi will be
composed of a number of parameters which will be important to decide if an event is malicious or
non-malicious. For instance, for a network packet, these parameters can include protocol, inter-
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arrival time, packet size etc. Therefore, Ehi can be represented as:
Ehi : {p1, p2, p3, · · · pn}
where pn is a specific parameter for an event.
Within the context of the above scenario, the Detection Engine DE is expected to categorize
Eh as malicious or non-malicious. The intrusion detection policy Ph is envisioned to contribute
towards this decision. Therefore, if SEhi represents the state of an event Ehi , the following can be
represented as the intrusion detection function.
SEhi : DE (Ehi ,Ph)
We define the following data models to be used throughout our formal description.
EH: a set of events for the host H
SE: state of an event; it can be malicious or non-malicious
P: Detection policy
EVENTS: a set of all the events forwarded to the CA
MEVENTS : set of malicious events forwarded to the CA
HOSTS: a set of hosts within a LoWPAN
PRECOND : a set of pre-conditions
POSTCOND : a set of post-conditions
DEPEND: a set of dependencies among malicious events
[Node Level Intrusion Detection]
∆HostID
EHID? : N
EHi? : EH
PHi? : PH
SEHi? : SE
EHID > 0
EH 6=<>
PH 6=<>
SH 6=<>
if EHi ∈ EH then
SEHi = DE (EHi ,PHi)
if SEHi = Malicious then
Intrusion Response(EHi ,SEHi)
4.2 Edge Router module
The edge router module called the Global Detection Enactor (GDE) has three subcomponents i.e.
Detection Agent, Correlation Agent (CA) and Alert Collector (AC). As the GDE is responsible
for a LoWPAN, it is expected to monitor hosts within that LoWPAN.
Let us define HOSTS as the set of hosts monitored by a GDE where H is a specific instance
within this set. As described in the previous section, each host is expected to implement a node
level detection engine DEi which is tasked with categorizing events within that host as malicious
or non-malicious. The AC is expected to gather this stream of events EH from the DE to be
processed within the GDE. One of the significant tasks performed by the GDE is the CA i.e. to
correlate multiple events to identify any multi-stage attacks. This is a complex task and is achieved
by taking into account dependencies between individual events.
In order to illustrate the significance of the dependencies between different malicious events
considers the following example from [53].
ME1=SadmindPing: (VictimIP, VictimPort, ExistsHost(VictimIP), VulnerableSadmind(VictimIP)),
and
ME2=SadmindBufferOverflow: (VictimIP, VictimPort, ExistsHost(VictimIP) ∧ Vulnerable-
Sadmind(VictimIP), GainrootAccess(VictimIP)).
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For ME1 pre-cond can be described as:
({VictimIP ,VictimPort},ExistsHost(VictimIP)), which means that it requires a validVictimIP
and VictimPort to be successful in its operation i.e. ping. The post−cond for the same event can be
described as {VulnerableSadmind(VictimIP)} which means that a successful ping can result in the
discovery of a vulnerable service for the victim host represented by VictimIP . For ME2, pre-cond
can be described as {VictimIP ,VictimPort}, ExistsHost(VictimIP) ∧ VulnerableSadmind(VictimIP)
which means that it requires a valid VictimIP , VictimPort and availability of a vulnerable victim
service. The post − cond for this event is described as {GainrootAccess(VictimIP)} which means
that a successful buffer overflow, in this case, can result in gaining root access for the victim.
[Evaluate Dependencies]
∆Correlation Agent
EHi? : EVENTS
MEHi? : MEVENTS
H ? : HOSTS
pre − cond? : PRE − COND
post − cond? : POST − COND
dependencies! :<>
MEHi? ∈ MEVENTS
MEVENTS 6=<>
PRE − COND 6=<>
POST − COND 6=<>
if pre − cond? = post − cond then
dependencies ′ = dependencies ∪MEHi?
The above description of the pre and post conditions for the two malicious events result in the
identification of a relationship between the two seemingly distinct events. We use the above
description to highlight the role of dependencies between different steps of an attack which help
identifying a complex multi-stage attack. Within the context of the proposed scheme, we use the
concept of dependencies among individual events within a 6LoWPAN network to detect a complex
attack attempt.
Let us define EVENTS as the set of all the events monitored by CA and MEVENTS as the set
of events identified as malicious by the node level DE. Furthermore, the pre and post conditions
are represented by [PRE − COND ] and [POST − COND ], the CA populates a directed graph
using the dependencies identified among the malicious events. The set of these malicious events is
represented by [DEPEND ] in the formal system specification.
The principle followed to establish this set is borrowed from the domain of alert correlation [54]
and is as follows: in order to establish these dependencies, each malicious event is considered as a
tuple represented as ME = (EHi , pre − cond , post − cond). As described earlier, the parameters
pre-cond and post-cond are established at the policy definition stage for intrusion detection using
system call based policies. Now, for each malicious event MEj occurring at time tj , a malicious
event MEi occurring at time ti is dependent on if and only if (MEi .post − cond = MEj .pre −
cond) ∧ (ti < tj ). This establishes a directed acyclic graph where the nodes represent malicious
events and the edges represent the relationship between these events.
[Detection Engine]
∆Correlation Agent
MEHi?,MEHj ? : MEVENTS
EHi? : EVENTS
dependencies − evaluation :
(EHi ,PRE − COND ,POST − COND)→ PDEPEND
devent : DEPEND
MEVENTS 6=<>
DEPEND 6=<>
if (MEHi .post − cond = MEHj .pre − cond) ∧ (ti < tj ) then
Intrusion Response(MEHi ,MEHj )
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The functional description for the detection engine is explained above via the Z-notation. The
dependency evaluation described earlier is the core pre-requisite for the detection engine as it
identifies the linkages between different malicious events. The dataset of such dependencies is
presented by the set DEPEND. Given the definitions for MEH, postCOND , preCOND , ti and tj ,
the detection engine seeks to identify the correlation between the individual malicious events and
executes appropriate, predefined intrusion response if the dependencies are valid.
4.3 Formal evaluation
In order to evaluate the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed intrusion detection scheme
for M2M networks, formal analysis of the scheme has been performed. The formal specification
of the proposed intrusion detection scheme presented in section 4.1 and 4.2 has been used as a
reference for these proofs. The formal analysis aims to assess the resilience of the proposed system
to mitigate against multi-stage attacks. We prove the system resilience against multi-stage attacks.
This property represents the evaluation of the scheme with respect to mitigation against multi-
stage attacks. It can be formally represented as under.
((∃1 Ehi | DE (Ehi)) ∧ (¬ΣDE (Ehi))) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
In order to prove this, we can divide this into two parts. For the first part,
⇔ (∃1 Ehi |(Ehi)) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
From specification,
∀Ehi | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS • (MEHi .postcond = MEHj .precond) ∧ (ti < tj ) | (SHEi = Malicious ∧
SHEi=Malicious)
⇔ DE (Ehi) ∧ SHEi= Malicious
⇔ DE (EHi) | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS ∧ Ehi ∈ DEPEND ∧ SHEi=Malicious
⇔ DE (EHi) | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS ∧ Ehi ∈ DEPEND ∧DE (Ehi) | Ehi ∈ DEPEND
⇔ DE (EHi) | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS ∧ Ehi ∈ DEPEND ∧ DE (Ehi) ∈ DEPEND • dependencies ′ =
dependencies ∪ (Ehi)
⇔ (Ehi .postcond = Ehj .precond) ∧ j > i
⇔ ¬(∃1 Ehi | (Ehi))
⇔ false ⇔ false
The above analysis proves that the hypothesis ⇔ ¬(∃1 Ehi | DE (Ehi)) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS i.e.
the intrusion detection performed at the edge router level takes into account multiple events and
the dependencies among them.
Now the second part can be written as under. (¬ΣDE (Ehi)) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
From specification,
∀Ehi | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS • (MEHi .postcond = MEHj .precond) ∧ (ti < tj ) | (SHEi = Malicious ∧
SHEi = Malicious)
⇔ DE (Ehi) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS ⇔ DE (Ehi) + DE (dependencies → Indivdamage)
⇔ DE (Ehi) + DE (dependencies → Indivdamage)∧ : νFDEPEND •DEPEND 6=<>
⇔ DE (Ehi) + ΣMEdi ,DE (Medi) •Medi ∈ dependencies •DEPEND neq <>
⇔ DE (Ehi) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
⇔ false
The above analysis proves the hypothesis (¬ΣDE (Ehi)) • EhiΣMEVENTS to be false i.e. the
intrusion detection decision evaluated by the proposed scheme does not take into account the
legitimacy of each malicious event, to be false. From the above analysis, it can be concluded that
the hypothesis is not valid for the proposed intrusion detection scheme. This is proved as both the
conditions necessary for the hypothesis to be true have been found false in accordance with the
formal specification of the intrusion detection scheme. Therefore the effectiveness of the intrusion
detection scheme to correctly evaluate an intrusion whilst taking into account potential multiple
stages of the intrusion is validated. However, as has been highlighted by this analysis, the correct
operation of the scheme is reliant on the accuracy of the events data and the process of identifying
dependencies between the individual events. Therefore, in order to ensure correct operation of the
intrusion detection scheme, these aspects are required to be addressed comprehensively.
5 Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe the network setup we have used to evaluate the proposed intrusion
detection system. The proposed framework was implemented with the widely used operating
12
system for IoT i.e. Contiki OS [55, 56]. The evaluation was conducted using Contiki v2.7 and its
built-in emulator Cooja [57].
5.1 IoT Environment
The proposed IoT network is presented in Figure 4. It consists of a border router (BR) that acts
as the DODAG root for the 6loWPAN network and connects it to the Internet through a SLIP
interface to a computer. This computer node has higher processing power than the HOST nodes
in the 6loWPAN network. The BR can also be referred to as an Edge Router.
The first tier of nodes that are a part of the 6LoWPAN are referred to in this work as routers/IDS
nodes and are used to implement the host-based intrusion detection component. These nodes
are responsible for forwarding messages to the root as well as periodically sending information
regarding the behavior of other nodes in the network located under them in the RPL tree. In this
work, the router nodes are always located one hop away from the root. The malicious node is
located in the second tier and can have access to the network through one of the router nodes in
the first tier. Its location can vary but in the interests of simplicity, it will always fall two hops
away from the root. This is to ensure that all traffic originating from it will pass through one of
the router nodes.
R
BR
R RRR
BR
R
USB/SLIP
Wireless Link
Border/Edge 
Router
Router/IDS 
node
Malicious 
node
6LOWPAN
Possible 
location of the 
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Figure 4: IDS Proposed Topology.
Simulations were performed within the Cooja Emulator with Tmote Sky Motes [58] as the cho-
sen emulated motes. Tmote Sky node use CC2420 IEEE802.15.4 radio transceiver with 250kbps
data rate operating in the 2.4GHz ISM band. Additionally, Tmote Sky has 48kb of flash and 10kb
of RAM. The simulated network was created with one BR, 5 router nodes, and one malicious node.
The location of the malicious node was changed between simulation runs to represent the dynamic
nature of the IoT networks. However, due to the performance of RPL, the information it sends
is always forwarded to its preferred parent, normally the router node closest to it. A snapshot
showing the topology as created with COOJA is shown in Figure 5, where node 1 is the BR, nodes
2-6 are the IDS nodes, and node 7 is the malicious node.
We initiated the experimentation by performing a set of simulations in order to measure a baseline
to be used to compare the performance of the proposed IDS system. This is achieved by simulating
the network shown in the above-mentioned figure but without the presence of the malicious node.
Router nodes in the baseline setup do not have any special additional code, they act as RPL routers
and exchange only RPL control messages between themselves and the root. The baseline will be
used to show the effect of the IDS system on the limited resources of the motes.
Another, issue that has been taken into consideration is the Radio Duty Cycle (RDC). In IoT
networks, the rate of data transmission is usually low as compared to other networks. Therefore,
in order to save the limited power of the nodes, it is not logical to keep the radio on whilst there
is no active transmission being conducted.
This triggered many RDC protocols that are designed specifically to control the rate at which nodes
can turn on or off their respective radios throughout their lifetime. In Contiki OS, the prominent
RDC protocol is referred to as ContikiMAC. It takes into consideration the sleep patterns of dif-
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Figure 5: IDS Proposed Topology.
ferent nodes in the network when transmitting or receiving. When there is a packet to send, the
node in question turns on its radio, sends the packet, waits for an acknowledgment (ACK) packet
before turning off the radio and going back to sleep. If an ACK packet is not received, a retrans-
mission cycle starts that either ends when an ACK is received or when the maximum number of
retransmissions is reached. Additionally, ContikiMAC periodically turns on the radio to listen for
transmissions or send updates regarding the state of the network.
Contiki OS also features an RDC protocol that keeps the radio alive regardless of active commu-
nication called NullRDC. In this paper, we have simulated the network both with duty cycling
using Contikimac and without duty cycling using nullrdc. This is important as different RDC can
greatly change the power consumption pattern of the node which may overshadow the effect of the
IDS system.
Throughout this work, we have mainly focused on two parameters: the extra power consumption of
the intrusion detection system and the extra memory footprint caused by adding the IDS features
to the router nodes. These two metrics are discussed in more detail in the following subsections.
5.2 Power Measurements
As the nodes in a 6LowPAN network are usually resource constrained therefore any additional
feature added to them will have to take into consideration the extra power consumption it adds to
the nodes. Power measurements were made using the powertrace tool included in Contiki OS [59].
This tool shows the time each node spends in one of four states i.e. transmitting (Tx ), receiving
(Rx), low power mode (LPM), and processing (CPU). Using these values, the energy (E) of a node
that is operating with a nominal voltage (V) can be calculated by multiplying the time value for
each state by the current consumption of that respective state using the following formula
E (mWs) = V ∗ (Tx ∗ 19.5 + Rx ∗ 21.8 + LPM ∗ 0.0545 + CPU ∗ 1.8) (1)
The values in the above equation are taken from the Tmote Sky data sheet and they are shown in
Table 1.
Table 1: Base measurement units for Tmote-Sky nodes.
Typical Operating Conditions MIN NOM MAX UNIT
Supply voltage 2.1 3.6 V
Supply voltage during flash memory 2.7 3.6 V
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio RX 21.8 23 mA
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio TX 19.5 21 mA
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio off 1800 2400 µA
Current Consumption: MCU idle, Radio off 54.5 1200 µA
Current Consumption: MCU standby 5.1 21.0 µA
The average power consumption of a single node can be calculated using the following formula.
Power(mW ) =
Energy(mWs)
Time(s)
(2)
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Which takes into consideration the real time each node was active. Results obtained are discussed
in Section 6.
5.3 RAM and ROM usage
Another scarce resource in low power networks (6LoWPAN) is the memory of the nodes. As these
nodes are cheap, small, and usually expendable, they do not come with great amount of memory.
As mentioned before with the tmote sky, it has only 48kb of flash and 10kb of RAM. Therefore,
we measured the footprint of the code for the baseline setup and for the IDS setup to analyze the
performance impact of proposed system. Results for the baseline power and energy consumptions
are presented in the next section for both with and without duty cycling.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we present and evaluate the results obtained for the experimentation discussed in
the previous section.
6.1 Power measurements
The experiments have been performed using COOJA emulator simulating the network presented
in the previous section. For each simulation run, the malicious node sends UDP packets to the
border router as its destination. Different settings of the transmission rate were tested i.e. 1, 10,
100, and 1000 packets per second. Additionally, two variations on the operation of IDS nodes were
tested. The first is when the IDS node sends an update to the Border Router (BR) each time it
receives 5 packets from the malicious node, referred as IDS mode5 in the figures. The second case
is when the number of received packets is 10, presented as IDS mode10. This update message is
a UDP message containing the source and destination IP, the source and destination port number
of the malicious packets. This update message will be referred as an IDS packet. As it holds the
information regarding all malicious packets sent, its size will depend on the number of malicious
packets sent from the malicious node.
Figures 6 - 9 demonstrate the power consumption of the IDS node for the different scenarios
simulated. The consumed power was measured after 5, 10, 15, and 20 minutes of run time with
duty cycling enabled. Each plot also includes the baseline power consumptions that were measured
when the nodes do not have any additional IDS component, i.e they are operating as normal RPL
nodes. This was performed to provide an insight into the amount of power these nodes consume
to execute basic RPL code.
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Figure 6: Power vs Time Consumption of the IDS node with duty cycling.
As can be deduced from Figures 6 - 9, the power consumption increases with the change in
mode of operation for IDS node. This is because the size of an IDS packet increases when the
payload increases based on number of packets from the malicious node. However, this increase is
not significant to alter the overall power consumption of the system.
Another observation is that measuring the power consumption at a specific time intervals may be
unfair because the number of packets sent from the malicious node is not same for each scenario.
Therefore, we have also measured the power consumption at the instances after a certain number of
packets from the malicious node have been received by the IDS node. This trend can be observed
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Figure 7: Power vs Time Consumption of the IDS node with duty cycling.
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Figure 8: Power vs Time Consumption of the IDS node with duty cycling.
in Figures 10 - 13.
Additionally, we have tested the system without duty cycling, i.e. when the radio is always
on and nodes never sleep. As expected, the results are almost equal for all the scenarios tested
independently on the transmission rate. This is because the CPU consumes negligible power when
compared with the power consumed by the radio. As the radio is always turned on, we cannot
really see the difference in power consumption by the different scenarios. Nevertheless, the results
where the malicious node is sending with 1 packet/sec rate are presented in the Figure 14.
6.2 Memory Overhead
As memory is an important resource on the node and therefore we have performed experimentations
to assess the effect of proposed IDS component on a node. The memory footprint of the IDS module
has been measured for both the baseline setup and the IDS setup. The memory overhead caused
by the adding IDS functionality to the nodes is presented in Table 2.
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Figure 9: Power vs Time Consumption of the IDS node with duty cycling.
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Figure 10: Power Consumption vs Number of transmitted packets of the IDS node with duty
cycling.
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Figure 11: Power Consumption vs Number of transmitted packets of the IDS node with duty
cycling.
The results of our experimentations demonstrate that packet size for the proposed IDS does
not affect the ROM overhead. This is achieved as the IDS does not rely on that size. However,
the RAM footprint requirements increase with the IDS packet size as more data will be saved in
the memory to be sent at once. Furthermore, it is observed that the overhead is agnostic of duty
cycle protocol employed as the additional application layer IDS is consistent across the underlying
protocols used.
7 Discussion
In IoT networks, the IDS can be placed in two places, at the edge router or at the end host. The
IDS placed at the edge router has the capability of blocking malicious traffic at the network entry
point thus protect the end nodes from the malicious traffic. However, an IDS at the edge router
might not consider the behaviour of the devices themselves and may lead to high communication
overheads between nodes and the edge router. On the other hand, an IDS at the end nodes
can monitor the performance of end nodes but it requires high processing overheads resources
(processing, storage, and energy).
The existing IDSs for IoT networks are mostly isolated and monitors a single device by per-
forming analysis for the attacks on a local device. There is no communication taking place between
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Figure 12: Power Consumption vs Number of transmitted packets of IDS node with duty cycling.
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Figure 13: Power Consumption vs Number of transmitted packets of IDS node with duty cycling.
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Figure 14: Power vs Time consumption for IDS node without duty cycling.
the nodes to make a collaborative detection. The standalone system will not detect most advanced
and distributed attacks. Moreover, standalone systems will not be able to correlate the traffic
statistics or malicious traffic passing through a number of devices at the same time. Furthermore,
the standalone IDS systems always perform the detection function with respect to seen traffic on its
deployed node, thus allowing the intruder to misuse the device for longer time periods. Naturally,
collaboration among devices could provide the effective defense. In a collaborative system such as
the one proposed in this paper, the end devices or IDS at the nodes monitor the traffic patterns
and reports the events to the centralized or distributed system for event correlation and feedback
aggregation. This paper represents the first attempt towards the design of collaborative intru-
sion detection system for the IoT network without incurring high communication or computation
overheads.
Most current IDS approaches that have designed for IoT networks are mainly dependent on the
underlying routing protocols (6LoWPAN and RPL). To the best of our knowledge, no approach is
proposed that is generic and perform intrusion detection regardless of routing protocols. The work
presented in this paper not only can be applied to a variety of routing protocols, and incorporates
collaboration between nodes in the network for early and effective detection of attacks in the
resource-constrained network. Our measurement results for RAM and energy consumptions reveals
that the approach is lightweight and can be used in the resource-constrained set of devices. The
total RAM size in the Tmote sky is 10 kb, hence COLIDE system can be deployed with the ram
capacity of only 230 bytes.In terms of energy overheads, our simulation results show that the node
requires only around 5mW of power for processing 1000 packets, which is negligible for the ultra-low
power Tmote sky.
Size of IDS
Packets
RAM
overhead
(Bytes)
ROM
overhead
(Bytes)
With Duty
Cycling
5 230 980
10 420 980
Without
Duty Cycling
5 230 980
10 420 980
Table 2: Memory Overhead caused by the IDS functionality.
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8 Conclusions
Security for IoT infrastructures is an emerging concern which requires dedicated efforts to address it
effectively. This paper has focused on one specific challenge within security i.e. intrusion detection
taking into account characteristics such as resource constraints of the things and communication
among these devices. The paper has proposed a novel framework for intrusion detection which
combines host and network-based detection to achieve efficient intrusion detection for IoT using
6LoWPAN.Furthermore, the paper represents pioneering effort to address the challenge of detect-
ing multi-stage attacks for IoT infrastructures by adopting a collaborative approach. The paper
has presented a detailed formal specification and analysis of the proposed system to aid its imple-
mentation in a real-life setting. The paper has also presented a detailed evaluation of the system
using Contiki and Cooja simulating different scenarios to identify the overall efficiency achieved by
it. Both formal and empirical evaluation of the system demonstrate its effectiveness with respect
to efficient intrusion detection for IoT networks. We aim to continue this work with security eval-
uation of the framework such as detection accuracy and time being immediate consideration for
further work.
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